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Last Chance Therapies: Can a Just and Caring Society Do
Health Care Rationing When Life Itself Is at Stake?
Leonard M. Fleck, Ph.D.*
What does it mean to be a just and caring society (or a just and caring
hospital or managed care plan) when we have only limited resources to
meet virtually unlimited health care needs, and the need before us now is a
person faced with death in the near future unless she or he has access to a
very expensive medical intervention that offers only a relatively small
chance of a relatively small gain in life expectancy? Such medical
interventions are what Norman Daniels and James Sabin refer to as "last
chance therapies" because patients who need them have no other medical
options to forestall death in the foreseeable future.' It is difficult to
imagine a more psychologically and morally burdensome decision than
whether to offer a last chance therapy.
This Article attempts to determine how such last chance therapy
rationing decisions should be made within the broad structure of the U.S.
health care system-a very fragmented, public-private system for financing
health care that is dominated by a variety of managed care options
intended to control h~alth care costs more effectively than the indemnity
insurance system.2 The focus of this Article can be interpreted in two ways:
First, what moral norms should be used in making these last chance
rationing decisions? Given all of the health care needs that exist in our
society, and given limited resources to meet those needs (limits ultimately
determined by taxpayers or members of a managed care plan), what
priority should access to various last chance therapies have relative to all
other health needs that make presumptively just claims on health
resources? Second, what should be the political-philosophical framework
of managed care plans responsible for making these last chance rationing
decisions? That is, would we be more likely to get morally defensible last
chance rationing decisions if the political philosophy that shaped the
functioning of our managed care plan were libertarian, communitarian
(Ezekiel Emanuel's vision 3), or liberal (in the Rawlsian sense)?
* Leonard M. Fleck is Professor of Philosophy and Medical Ethics in the Philosophy
Department and Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences at Michigan State
University.
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I will argue that limited solidarity and limited community (the "caring"
part of the 'Just Caring" problem) can be adequately protected under a
liberal conception of health care justice, and such a limited notion is
sufficient to protect these values as much as they ought to be protected.
Going beyond these limits will threaten both the liberality and the justness
of our society as far as health care is concerned. I will also argue that the
first virtue of our health care system, and of managed care plans within
that health care system, must be the virtue of justice. My intent is to reject
the views of both libertarians, who would assign value preeminence to
unequal liberty, and communitarians, such as Michael Sandel, 4 who would
relegate justice to the status of a minor remedial virtue of social
institutions. Finally, I will argue that the best approach to resolving fairly
the last chance therapy problem will be through a form of rational
democratic deliberation, which I describe below. Such an approach will
yield rationing decisions when life itself is at stake that are 'just enough,"
that protect 'just liberty" adequately enough, and that sufficiendy maintain
the bonds of a liberal pluralistic community.
The practical implication of the philosophic claims I advance above is
that we want our managed care plans to be Rawlsian-like liberal political
communities on a small scale. 5 This would mean that members of these
plans would not necessarily share with one another any comprehensive
vision of the good (or even a vision of the good as it related to health
care). Instead, they would share a commitment to a certain set of liberal
virtues and liberal social practices, the most important of which would be a
commitment to rational democratic deliberation as the primary method
through which social conflict within the plan would be addressed (i.e.,
problems such as the last chance therapy rationing problem).
Health care rationing decisions need to be made communally, if they
are to be made fairly. There is no practical way for individuals as
individuals to make rationing decisions for themselves of the range and
complexities required by our current health care system and still preserve
overall fairness. But we also readily recognize that rationing decisions need
to be made freely and autonomously if they are to have moral and political
legitimacy. After all, rationing (as used in this Article) is about denying
individuals what all would agree is beneficial health care-albeit what is
judged from some larger social point of view to be marginally beneficial,
non-costworthy health care.6 Still, it will sometimes be the case, as with last
chance therapies, that marginally beneficial care is what might make the
difference between life and death for a given individual (if only for a
relatively brief period of time). Given the significance of an outcome like
this, in a liberal society such a decision should be endorsed at some level
11:2 (2002)
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by the individual who will bear the burden of that decision. Otherwise, we
would need a compelling moral argument for the claim that there is
someone else who has the moral authority to impose such a decision on
this individual. It is not obvious what such an alternate source of moral
authority might be that would still be liberally defensible.
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM OF LAST CHANCE THERAPY RATIONING
A. Last Chance Therapies: Some Examples
For the sake of clarity, I call attention to four concrete examples of last
chance therapies to focus and illustrate the problem. First, Herceptin
therapy is for the 25% of women with metastasized breast cancer (roughly
12,000 women per year in the United States) who have HER-2 receptors,
which unfortunately hasten the progression of cancer Second, the left
ventricular assist device (LVAD) is for patients with end-stage congestive
heart failure-about 550,000 new patients suffer from this problem each
year in the United States.8 Third, the totally implantable artificial heart
(TIAIH) is for patients with end-stage heart disease. This device is in the
earliest stages of clinical testing,9 but it would offer hope of prolonged life
to about 350,000 individuals per year in the United States who would
otherwise die from their heart disease. ° Fourth, total parenteral nutrition
(TPN) can be used for infants, usually born prematurely, who do not have
a functioning gut, and hence, do not have the capacity to process food in
the normal way. About 4,000 such infants are born each year in the United
States."
The common features of last chance therapies that create our moral
problem are the following: First, the cost of the therapy itself is very high at
the individual level. In the examples above, the costs per person range
from $100,000 to several hundred thousand dollars. In the case of infants
with necrotic small bowel syndrome, the costs of TPN range from $50,000
to $200,000 per year, and these infants can now survive for four years. 12 A
medically and morally troubling fact about TPN is that the therapy that
prolongs the infants' lives also destroys their livers.13 Liver damage will
cause their deaths unless we provide them with liver transplants at a cost of
about $200,000 each. 4 A liver transplant might only yield an extra two
years of life, and the next alternative, being an experimental total bowel
transplant, would cost $600,000.15
Second, the aggregate cost of treating all who are in similar medical
circumstances is very high and grossly disproportional to what would seem
to be a reasonable share of total health resources. In the case of the TIAH,
for example, we could be looking at annual increases in health care
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expenditures of about $52 billion in an economy in which we currently
spend a little more than $1.3 trillion on health care.'6 If we were looking at
only a few hundred or a few thousand of these high-cost interventions, the
moral reality would be that we could afford such interventions, and we
might be fairly judged indecent and uncaring if we failed to provide them.
But the potential aggregate demand is very great and essentially
unavoidable as a moral problem.
Third, the terminal prognosis itself is unaltered by all of the above
interventions. There is no reasonable medical expectation that any of these
interventions will bring about a medical miracle and provide an individual
with an open-ended life expectancy. Each of these interventions promises
some gain in life expectancy with an acceptable quality of life, but nothing
more than that."
Fourth, the gain in life expectancy will vary considerably from one
individual to another, and from one therapeutic intervention to another,
often depending upon a mix of factors that will not be well understood at
the individual level; but fifth, from some larger social perspective the
general judgment will be that the gains in life expectancy are mostly
marginal. The clear case of that is Herceptin therapy where the average
increase in life expectancy (compared to conventional therapy for women
with metastasized breast cancer and HER-2 receptors) is five months.8
By way of contrast, treatment of HIV-positive patients with protease
inhibitors and combination therapy in the later stages of that disease, or
renal dialysis for patients with end-stage renal failure, both cost less and
produce longer life expectancies. Costs for protease inhibitors are about
$20,000 for each year of life gained,' 9 while costs for dialysis are about
$45,000 for each year of life gained. 0 Individuals in these medical
circumstances might be described as being "terminally ill" because their
diseases represent the most likely causes of their future deaths, but their
life expectancies are actually much more open-ended and indefinite,
stretching out for a couple decades or more in the case of many dialysis
patients. For this reason I think of them as being in a different category for
purposes of moral analysis than the last chance category I am delineating
here.2'
Finally, all the patients I have in mind as last chance patients want
access to these expensive, marginally beneficial therapies. The painful
acuity of our moral problem would be significantly diminished if these
therapies generally offered prolonged life filled with substantial pain and
suffering. We, societal or institutional decision-makers, could then
convince ourselves that the truly right and compassionate thing to do
would be to expend substantial effort to persuade these patients to reject
11:2 (2002)
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these interventions as therapeutic mirages. This would allow us to avoid
having to think of ourselves as making a rationing decision that would
bring about the "premature" death of an individual. However, the medical
reality is that this source of solace is generally not available in these
circumstances.
B. Last Chance Therapies: Distinctive Moral Features
A number of morally relevant considerations seem to put last chance
therapies into a distinctively weighty moral category, and, in addition,
make rationing decisions with respect to such therapies an exceptional
psychological burden.
First, it is partly for monetary reasons that we are motivated to deny an
individual access to life-prolonging technology. It is for reasons of "fiscal
scarcity" rather than "absolute scarcity" that we deny an individual this
medical intervention.22 If we had only so many transplantable organs, we
would still feel regret that we had to deny a certain individual one of those
organs, but we would know that some number of individuals would be
denied those organs no matter what. In the case of money, however,
especially in a $9 trillion economy, we can always imagine some other
source for funds that would lift this burdensome decision from our
shoulders.
Second, it is ultimately an identifiable individual who is denied this
expensive life-prolonging care, someone with a name and face who will
elicit our natural sympathies. It seems uncaring, cold-hearted, disturbingly
calculating, and violative of the core virtues essential for any civilized
community to have a medical intervention at our fingertips that offers
some small hope of life prolongation an individual desperately wants, but
still our intent is to deny that individual access because it is not cost-
effective from a larger, abstract social point of view. Another way of making
the same point is to say that it involves "putting a price on human life,"
making the judgment that some lives are not worth saving. That judgment
may be morally and psychologically tolerable when we are talking about
"statistical lives," but it seems intolerable when we are talking about an
identified person. If, for example, we were aware of miners trapped 1,000
feet below the surface, climbers trapped in a storm on a mountain peak, or
a physician in Antarctica at risk for pancreatitis, then we would never call
off a rescue effort because some speedy fanatical accountant calculated
that the rescue effort would cost a minimum of $6 million with no
guarantee of success (and this was really an economically irrational use of
resources).
Third, we can debate about whether there is a right to health care, or
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whether we have a societal moral obligation to be responsive to the health
care needs of all. We can argue about precisely how we ought to define a
health "need" or how encompassing the domain of health care needs
ought to be. But in the last chance therapy situation I have in mind, it is
unambiguously clear that if there is anything that can be called a health
need, and if such a need ever generates a moral obligation to be
responsive, then this is a paradigmatic situation where there is an
obligation to provide access to a medical intervention that offers an
individual's only hope to forestall death for some period of time. We might
interpret this as an obligation of justice (these are people whom Rawls
would classify as being among the "medically least well off") or we might
interpret it as an obligation of beneficence. In either case, the operative
word is "obligation," the intent being to suggest that it would be especially
inapt to consider making rationing decisions with regard to patients in
these circumstances.
C. Last Chance Therapies: Why Rationing Is Inescapable
To avoid confusing the reader, I emphasize that the material in the
prior section should be read as an uncritical description of the moral
phenomenology associated with last chance therapies and rationing. The
practical conclusion one is supposed to draw from that analysis is that
decisions to deny individuals last chance therapies are just plain morally
intolerable. But I reject that conclusion. The need for health care
rationing in general is really inescapable. Some may be tempted to argue
that getting rid of waste and inefficiency in the health care system is the
real moral imperative, and those matters must be addressed completely
before any rationing decisions receive a moral seal of approval. At a
general enough level, I would agree with this view. But, among other
things, closer inspection often will show that one person's "waste and
inefficiency" is another person's chance at life-sustaining medical care.
2 3
Still, a critic might insist that if rationing is inescapable, then we
should make all our rationing decisions around care where life itself is not
directly at stake. Unfortunately, the fact of the matter is that we could not
possibly save enough money that way to avoid the more difficult sorts of
rationing decisions associated with last chance therapies.14 The general line
of argument, which my last chance therapy examples above are intended
to illustrate, is that the proliferation of expensive life-saving and life-
prolonging medical technologies has become so expansive (and has
resulted in the proliferation of what we categorize from a moral
perspective as "health needs") that not even a society as affluent as our own
can afford to provide these technologies to all who have the relevant
11:2 (2002)
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medical needs. Further, it is generally the case that these emerging
technologies result in both prolonging lives and adding to the total burden
of costly chronic illness in our society. Thus, providing 350,000 artificial
hearts per year will substantially reduce heart disease as "the" cause of
death in our society while increasing the number of people who will die
from various cancers, strokes, or Alzheimer's disease, after they have
generated substantial costs for the treatment of these additional disorders.
Artificial hearts do not confer eternal life on anyone. We should conclude,
as I argued in an earlier article,25 that we cannot avoid "putting a price on
human life," that is, accepting that there are some lives and some life-years
that are too expensive to save. The real moral challenge then is to
determine what our understanding of health care justice permits or
requires in the way of making these rationing decisions.
In short, solving the problem of health care rationing requires that we
come up with a rationally compelling moral account of what it means to be
a just and caring society when we have only limited resources for meeting
virtually unlimited, extremely heterogeneous health needs. It also requires
a rationally compelling political/economic account of what will count as
costworthy health care from a point of view that is both social and
sufficiently respectful of individual judgments of costworthiness. Finally, we
need a rationally compelling account of health care rationing and the
social mechanisms required to implement it that is congruent with our
liberal and democratic political traditions.
D. Last Chance Therapies: Why Justice?
What should be the central moral or non-moral considerations that
determine how society, managed care plans, or employers make rationing
decisions with respect to last chance therapies? Should the ability of
individuals to pay for the therapy be that determining factor? In some
circumstances, as I explain below, that is the correct answer to give.
However, I hastily add that the appropriateness of those circumstances has
to be shaped by certain judgments of health care justice. I reject the view
that health care should be thought of as nothing more than another
commodity in the market to be distributed entirely on the basis of
individual ability to pay (with apologies to Tristram Engelhardt 6) since
that view almost entirely ignores the complex problems of health care
justice, which I will argue need to be addressed. To my mind, the most
serious of those problems would be the failure of such a libertarian health
care system to meet the health care needs of the most seriously chronically
ill, who will often find themselves unemployed, uninsured, and entirely
dependent upon the vagaries of local health care charitable impulses." I
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find Daniels' arguments in support of the view that health care is "morally
special" quite compelling.1
8
Our social practice is also worth noting. For example, as a society we
passed the 1972 End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) amendments to
Medicare, which underwrite the costs of either renal dialysis or renal
transplant for anyone in end-stage renal failure no matter what his or her
work or economic status. We found it morally intolerable that a society as
affluent as our own would simply allow people to die because they could
not afford the cost of dialysis (roughly $45,000 per year at present29), which
will often mean many extra years of life. In the year 1999, that program
cost in the aggregate about $14 billion and sustained the lives of more than
300,000 individuals. 0
We can argue, of course, as to what precisely was the moral motivation
for that decision. I would assert that it was a matter of health care justice.
Others might say it was no more than a charitable impulse expressed
societally. However, I find that explanation open to serious moral criticism.
Specifically, if it were no more than a charitable impulse, then it would
have to be morally unobjectionable if we were to decide as a society to
withdraw that funding for the indefinite future, with the result that literally
tens of thousands of those individuals would likely die in the space of a
year because they would be unable to afford dialysis. There is something
obligatory about our continuing that funding, unlike in a situation in
which I have contributed $25,000 to cancer research for each of five years
and then decide to donate no more. But someone could add that the
obligation is not necessarily a matter of justice; it could be better
characterized as an obligation of beneficence. That response strikes me as
being ethically incomplete. Other individuals, such as hemophiliacs
needing Factor VIII to sustain their lives, something that can be more
expensive than dialysis, can justly complain that there should be a national
program to fund their needs as well. After all, public resources are being
used to fund the dialysis program. It may not be morally necessary to show
that justice requires funding the dialysis program, but some argument
must be made to show that it is not unjust to fund it. At least in that
respect, considerations of health care justice must come into play. That
minimal point is all I wish to make for now.
I want to call attention to a very provocative argument made by Allen
Buchanan that deserves broader notice.3' He points out, contrary to
popular belief, that managed care plans are for the most part immune to
moral criticism, so far as matters of justice are concerned, as long as they
meet their contractual obligations to subscribers, and as long as they
observe basic understandings of procedural justice in the plan ("treat like
11:2 (2002)
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cases alike, so far as providing or denying benefits are concerned"). This is
because there are no substantive social agreements regarding what should
count as a basic or minimally decent package of health benefits that should
be guaranteed to all in our society, nor regarding what should count as
reasonable approaches to health care rationing/cost control with regard to
health benefits provided to subscribers, nor regarding what should count
as the level of quality of health care to be guaranteed to all subscribers
within a plan. With regard to these latter points, there is no agreement
among plan members, or in society at large, about what the relevant
substantive values or conceptions of justice would be that could identify
morally objectionable rationing judgments or morally objectionable quality
deficiencies. The only reference points for such judgments are the
exaggerated expectations of plan members. Buchanan writes: "Because no
authoritative standard has been determined for what constitutes the types
and quality of care to which everyone could be said to be entitled,
complaints that patients are treated unethically when they are denied care
or when they receive care of less than the highest quality are groundless.,
32
He also concludes that because we have no authoritative standard for the
care to which everyone is entitled there is no benchmark for determining
what a physician's fiduciary obligations are.
If Buchanan's analysis is correct as an empirical moral description,33 as
I believe it is, then this should be very unsettling for the average middle-
class American in managed care. It means that each year I, for example,
invest about $6,700 in this health care game of chance. The rules of the
game that determine when there is a payoff are less than perfectly clear,
and they are subject to sudden change or definitive interpretation by two
other very powerful players in the game (my employer and the insurer/
managed care plan), both of whom have strong interests in denying me a
payoff. I know that for small bets there are frequent and reliable payoffs,
but I find that to be of small comfort. When I and/or a family member are
faced with a very serious and potentially very expensive health crisis, then I
most want certainty that the payoff will be there. But it seems then that
there is the greatest uncertainty, and I have the least ability to control the
outcome of any bargaining or adjudicative process because I have little
political or moral power. Further, it would be small comfort to be told that
my managed care plan is committed to formal justice, that all plan
members will be treated alike in similar circumstances.
We can imagine any number of virtues that we would like to see our
managed care plan display in these very difficult circumstances. But all
these virtues would be nothing more than shifting in uncertain sand if the
policies and practices of that managed care plan were not rooted in
9
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explicit, substantive, and well-defined understandings of health care
justice. Imagine, for example, a managed care plan that advertised itself as
"caring and compassionate" and that exemplified those virtues every now
and then by "investing in" an expensive life-prolonging last chance therapy
for one of its plan members. Such sporadic displays of exemplary behavior
would hardly assuage our own anxiety as to whether we might be the
beneficiaries of such behavior in the future were we to face a life-
threatening medical crisis. Further, we could not help but note the fact
that it is "our money," our premiums, that are being used to underwrite
that generous response (and might not be there in the future, were we in
need of a similarly generous response).
Perhaps this would not be a practical problem if our managed care
plans were those single-minded idealized communities that some
communitarians would like to see more generally disseminated. But, for
the most part, we are moral strangers to one another in managed care
plans, which is why we need a rationally defensible basis for knowing when
we or others are entitled to draw on the common resources of the plan to
meet health needs. Shared understandings of health care justice
articulated through a shared process of rational democratic deliberation
are needed, the details of which I sketch below. The virtue of such shared
understandings achieved through a shared deliberative process is that they
constrain morally objectionable arbitrariness by plan administrators, shift
the power to make rationing decisions to those directly affected by those
decisions, and protect our liberal commitments to value pluralism.
E. Last Chance Therapies: Why Non-Ideal Justice ?
Though some philosophers with a more rationalistic bent might
believe that our philosophic theories are capable of yielding uniquely right
and uniquely rational responses to complex problems of health care
justice, this belief is excessively utopian. The empirical complexities
associated with our health care system and emerging medical technologies,
the uncertainty with respect to medical interventions, the possibilities for
trade-offs with respect to very complex mixes of rationing options-all of
the factors that Rawls tries to capture under the rubric of the "burdens of
judgment"34-defeat the hope that philosophy would have the resources to
yield complete resolutions to the justice problems associated with health
care rationing.
Daniels and I agree that no theory of just health care will prove
adequate to address the moral challenges alluded to above. As Daniels puts
it: "The general distributive principles appealed to by claimants as well as
by rationers do not by themselves provide adequate reasons for choosing
1I:2 (2002)
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among claimants: they are too schematic. "0 5 Ultimately, rationing decisions
come down to the level of individuals, and often those individuals will be
able to appeal to plausible distributional principles that would justify their
not being denied some type of health care that they need. If this is true, if
we have conflict and incoherence among distributional principles at the
level of individuals, and if what is at stake for these individuals is access to
health care that is perceived to be of great import (i.e., a last chance
therapy), then this is not a state of affairs that is morally or socially
tolerable. There would be enormous opportunity here for arbitrary or
discriminatory judgments to be made, as Buchanan has reminded us. Here
Daniels takes note of the move made by Rawls to deal with indeterminate
distributive principles, namely, an appeal to fair democratic procedures to
resolve the indeterminacy. Daniels, however, is not satisfied with this. He
finds that there are some strong moral objections that can be lodged
against this move to fair democratic procedures, which I discuss below.
The large view I defend is this: First, we should view health care as a
distinct "sphere of justice," as Michael Walzer36 uses this phrase. There are
features of health care in our society that make it distinct enough as a
social good that it requires its own principles of distributive justice.3 7 Three
broad areas would have to be addressed by these principles: fair access, fair
financing, and fair rationing/priority-setting/cost containment.
Second, the most we can hope to achieve would be a morally
defensible conception of non-ideal health care justice. We are faced with
the extremely complex moral problem of coming up with a framework for
fair health care rationing that can address 'justly enough" the concrete
problem of last chance therapies, as well as several related rationing
problems at a slightly more general level. These are often referred to in
the literature as the "ragged edge" problem, the "Rule of Rescue" problem,
and the "priorities" problem. These are not merely philosophical problems
of health care rationing; rather, these are problems that policy-makers
(private or public) in our society must address. We have no reason to
believe that there is any uniquely and perfectly rational, or uniquely and
perfectly just, theory of health care rationing that can address all these
problems. Rather, there are numerous trade-offs among competing moral
considerations and among competing considerations of health care justice
that will yield a pattern of rationing outcomes that will be 'just enough."
Within the framework of non-ideal justice (as I conceive it) our objective is
to come up with recommendations that will bring about more just policies,
practices, and patterns of health care rationing than currently exist. At the
very least we want to identify those features of our current rationing
practices that are clearly unjust. Within managed care plans we want to
11
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identify policies and practices with respect to health care rationing, trade-
offs of various sorts, that are 'Just enough" and not illiberal.
Third, the theoretical underpinnings for rational democratic
deliberation as an approach to just health care rationing are to be found in
a theory of public reason, as articulated by Rawls.39 The more theoretical
side of rational democratic deliberation, that is, the construction,
interpretation, specification, and mutual adjustment of the constitutional
principles of health care justice, should be thought of as a matter of wide
reflective equilibrium, as Rawls and Daniels would understand it. 0 The
more practical side of rational democratic deliberation, that is, the
construction and mutual adjustment of social policies and practices for
fairly, rationally, and democratically resolving the indeterminacies, trade-
offs, and priorities associated with health care rationing at the level of
concrete social practice, should be thought of as a matter of public reason
or democratic legitimation, as understood by Daniels and Sabin.'
The practice of reason-giving must be integral to our process of policy-
making, whether in the public sphere or in private managed care plans. In
addition, following John Dewey, the theoretical and practical dimensions
of public reason must not be separated from one another for purposes of
constructing a fair approach to health care rationing. The precise shape of
the domain of practical rational democratic deliberation will change as a
result of how effective resolution of concrete problems of health care
rationing brings about a refinement and specification of our broad
principles of health care justice. We see precisely this happening in our
legal practices of constitutional interpretation as our understanding of
privacy or free speech or other such broad matters evolves as a result of
our grappling with emerging social problems in these areas.
Fourth, rational democratic deliberation has moral legitimacy as an
approach to health care rationing because it best captures what respect for
individual autonomy is about in the rationing context. Rationing decisions
that involve the healthy, wealthy, and politically powerful imposing
rationing protocols on the sick, the poor, the vulnerable, and the
politically powerless are presumptively unjust. By way of contrast, rationing
protocols that we impose upon our future selves as a result of rational
democratic deliberation are presumptively just. There are, of course,
alternative approaches to health care rationing besides rational democratic
deliberation. These include markets/individual incentives, bureaucratic
rule-making, expert medical or technical judgment, or administrative
decision-making in a hospital, insurance company, or managed care plan.
But I have argued elsewhere 4 (and I take Emanuel and Emanuel to be
making the same point43) that all these alternative approaches are seriously
11:2 (2002)
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flawed as primary mechanisms for health care rationing, either from the
perspective of justice or from the perspective of respect for individual
autonomy. To be sure, there are appropriate places for the functioning of
all these alternate mechanisms in a scheme of health care rationing, but
the overarching framework for that scheme must be rational democratic
deliberation.
II. LIBERAL COMMUNITARIANISM: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
Should we embrace the communitarian vision of managed care
presented by Emanue144 rather than liberal rational democratic
deliberation for fairly addressing rationing issues? Emanuel wants to
permit, maybe encourage, managed care plans to be defined in terms of
some sort of comprehensive vision of a health good. What he rejects in the
liberalism of Rawls, Dworkin, and their philosophic brethren is the notion
of liberal neutrality. He sees this as a sham because liberalism itself
represents a fairly definite set of value commitments, which may be
congenial to many comprehensive visions of the good, but which may be
uncongenial to others-very often religiously based comprehensive
visions. Emanuel contends that there is something fundamentally wrong
with a political society that would force an individual to choose between
being a good liberal citizen and being a good Catholic, a good Amish
person, or a good Orthodox Jew. Thus, if we were to have some sort of
national health insurance, and if abortion services, physician-assisted
suicide, or embryonic genetic analysis and selection were funded benefits,
then some individuals who are deeply opposed on moral/religious
grounds to any or all of these practices would find themselves contributing
tax dollars/premium dollars to support these practices. This strikes
Emanuel as being illiberal and dishonest.
Emanuel sees the managed care movement as a way of escaping these
problems that is both protective of our liberal political traditions (minus
the neutrality commitment) and protective of the integrity of distinctive
religious/philosophic communities. He sees managed care plans as
possibly forming around differing organizational perspectives, including
religious commitments. He would give each family or citizen of our society
a voucher that would have a precise economic value sufficient to purchase
a very good package of health care benefits. Individuals could use these
vouchers to join whichever managed care plan they found congenial to
them in terms of a comprehensive vision. There would then be no
nationally required set of specified health care benefits/services. Instead,
members of each plan would decide among themselves the precise content
of their benefit package, up to whatever limit was allowed by the value of
13
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the vouchers, plus whatever private resources they were willing to add to a
common pool of resources for purchasing health care services. Emanuel
says the vouchers might be "graded," increased in value to reflect the likely
health needs of individuals with those vouchers so as to minimize any risk
of economic discrimination against older or chronically ill individuals.
Otherwise there would be a serious justice problem. However, we would
then need a national decision-making mechanism to do the grading. That
is, someone would need to decide which medical problems, with what
degree of severity, and with what likelihood of being responsive to various
more or less costly medical technologies, ought to be considered for
purposes of assigning a value to a particular voucher for a particular
individual.
Whose vision of the good would be operative at the national level for
this purpose? This is supposedly the problem that prompted Emanuel to
devise his proposal in the first place. But it looks like he still has that
problem, at least if he remains committed to protecting the overall justness
of the system. Could those religious managed care plans object that they
do not want their tax dollars spent, or the value of their own personal
health vouchers reduced, to accommodate what they regard as the
perverse health needs of the HIV-positive population, just as many object
to the use of federal money for the funding of abortions? If the federal
government were to respond positively to this challenge, then we would
have de facto discriminatory outcomes that are both illiberal and unjust.
If protecting pluralism is important, which means in political terms
protecting the right of individuals to form many kinds of communities
around many conceptions of the good, then a liberal government will have
to be neutral among different (sometimes competing) conceptions of the
good. That neutrality will be in the Justificatory" mode rather than the
"consequentialist" mode. In other words, in justifying any particular law or
policy, a liberal government will have to show that it is justified by appeal
to "thin" values and interests that can be reasonably construed as being
supportive of the general good of liberal citizens as liberal citizens in a
liberal society. That is, these are interests that transcend (but are also
necessary to support) the much thicker and more specific conceptions of
values that define the multiplicity of communities that comprise our
society as a whole. Our conception of justice, as Rawls articulates it, is
intended to be the most important value embraced by a liberal society, in
part as a way of protecting the stability and peacefulness of our society. I
emphasize that Rawls is a moral and political constructivist: The
conception of justice (or any other basic social value) is not simply "out
there" to be discovered; rather, it is constructed through rational
11:2 (2002)
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democratic deliberative processes, the resources of public reason, as we
struggle with emerging social problems, such as health care rationing.
Let us now apply this general framework to the last chance therapy
problem. Imagine that we have Emanuel-like managed care plans
organized around a core value such as "sanctity of life" or "maximum
healthy living." Those committed to the sanctity of life ideal may want
everything medically possible done to sustain their own lives or the lives of
their loved ones; thus they will want access to Herceptin, LVADs, TIAHs, or
TPN, all at plan expense. By way of contrast, those who are committed to
the ideal of maximum healthy living may adhere to the belief that most of
the chronic illnesses characteristic of contemporary Western society results
from bad lifestyle choices that "weak-willed" individuals in society make.
They want nothing to do with paying for the medical costs of this "weak-
willed" misbehavior. What they want funded with their health dollars is an
indefinitely large array of health-promoting practices and herbal
supplements, for example. Both sets of these individuals define strong
morally legitimate health needs from the perspective of their
comprehensive visions of the good.
How can individuals with such radically different visions of legitimate
health needs co-exist in the same health plan? This problem generates
Emanuel's vision of separating out into distinct managed care plans
adherents of all these different comprehensive visions. However, this move
does not solve any moral or practical problems. As noted above, if there is
some sort of national commitment to "necessary health care for all," and if
that is expressed through giving health vouchers to all, then some
economic value will have to be attached to the vouchers, and that value
cannot be fairly or reasonably determined by reference to what adherents
of different comprehensive visions judge to be their health needs. To
address that problem we will need some thin conception of health care
46justice that can be the focal point of an overlapping consensus.
A more telling point, however, is that this very same problem would
exist in each of these philosophically distinctive managed care plans we
have postulated. This is because there are, as a psychological and
sociological fact, indefinite degrees of commitment to the core vision of
the good that would define any of these plans by individual members of
these plans. Some members of the "maximum healthy living" plan will be
ultra-health enthusiasts (and demand health resources to achieve their
ultra-health goals) whereas others will be only "excellent" or "very good" or
"near average" health enthusiasts (still a couple standard deviations
beyond the minimal level of commitment to health promotion of the
average American). The same will be true in the "sanctity of life" managed
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care plan where some will enthusiastically endorse sustaining at all cost the
lives of Helga Wanglie and others in a persistent vegetative state, while
other plan members would see that as a wasteful and inappropriate use of
limited plan resources that ought to be directed to more support for last
chance therapies.
To resolve such possible conflicts within any of these plans appeal
would have to be made to some conception of health care justice, and a
method for justifying that conception, that is independent of the more
radical and less radical commitments of plan members to their central
value conception. If such a conception and method can be worked out
within these plans to prevent destabilizing and fractious bickering among
plan members, then the same conception and method can be appealed to
for purposes of resolving conflicts among these plans with respect to how
at the national level we ought to determine the value of health vouchers
that would be given to all. And if it is possible to achieve that to a sufficient
degree, then there is no need to try to organize health plans around
differing comprehensive visions, for we would then have the resources that
allowed individuals with very different deep comprehensive visions of the
good (health-related or not) to function fairly in relation to one another
within the bounds of liberal generic managed care plans.
My contention is that something akin to Rawls' liberal conception of
justice and something akin to the version of rational democratic
deliberation I describe below are necessary to achieve these objectives,
while at the same time preserving the value of community and solidarity to
the limited functional extent that is possible. Within the domain of health
care justice, Daniels has provided a helpful approach to addressing this
problem of diverse comprehensive visions with his fair equality of
opportunity account for identifying and prioritizing health needs47 since it
is fundamentally neutral among competing comprehensive visions. It is a
"thin" enough, but still substantive enough, value that it can address many
rationing problems, including some parts of the last chance therapy
problem.
III. JUST HEALTH CARE RATIONING: CRITICAL CHALLENGES
Daniels identifies four unsolved broad rationing problems.4 8 I will add
several more. My ultimate objective will be to show that rational
democratic deliberation provides us with a reasonable approach for
addressing all of these problems more fairly than any alternative. This
includes the last chance therapy problem. Daniels uses the Oregon priority
setting process as background for his critical observations. 49 Both Daniels
and I agree that the Oregon process is seriously flawed as a model of what
1I:2 (2002)
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rational democratic deliberation ought to be. Nevertheless, I have argued
that useful moral lessons can be drawn from that policy-making effort for
purposes of designing morally preferable examples of rational democratic
deliberation for health care rationing.
The first problem Daniels identifies is the "fair chances/best
outcomes" problem. At the micro level we have Alice and Betty. Both will
die in a week without an organ transplant; both are the same age; both
have been waiting in line for the same period of time. Alice is expected to
live two years with the transplant while Betty will live twenty. What does fair
treatment require in terms of determining who gets the transplant? From a
best outcomes perspective, certainly not unfair or unreasonable, Betty
would get the transplant. From a fair chances perspective, recognizing that
those two years are of ultimate importance to Alice, there ought to be a
lottery, which Alice demands. Both are plausible moral principles. How
can we reasonably decide which principle ought to prevail in of our
managed care plan?
51
Alice and Betty are merely abstract ciphers that hardly elicit
compassion. In the real world there are millions of individuals with
assorted disabilities who would fear a discriminatory outcome if our
consistent commitment were to best outcomes, especially if those outcomes
were measured by Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) .52 If, for example,
access to Herceptin therapy at plan expense were only available through
clinical trials, then most individuals with significant disabilities would be
excluded from such trials. If we wanted all women with metastasized breast
cancer to have fair access to limited slots in these trials, then the likely
result would be less reliable trial data. Is the desire for more reliable
clinical data (best outcomes) sufficient to justify denying individuals with
potentially confounding disabilities access to these trials and to the
possibility for prolonged life represented by Herceptin?
Daniels' second problem is the "priorities problem." Should we give
higher priority to those who need treatments that will yield greater net
benefits, or to those who are medically worse off, even if doing so does not
result in greater net benefits? The relevant moral intuition at stake here is
the Rawlsian Difference Principle-if inequalities are inescapable, then
institutions should be structured in such a way as to make the least well off
as well off as possible. Daniels asks us to imagine people with Condition 1
who are more seriously impaired by their disease/disability than people
with Condition 2. Treatments 1 and 2 will yield the same net gain in
benefits for either group. This suggests that priority would be given to
neither treatment. But Daniels says most of us would be inclined to treat
Condition 1 because these individuals were worse off to begin with, and
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this would be especially true if treatment still left these individuals
somewhat worse off than individuals with untreated Condition 2. But our
judgments in this matter would be less confident if those with Condition 1
ended up better off after treatment than those with Condition 2, who were
denied treatment. Daniels continues that if Treatment 2 yielded greater
net benefit for those with Condition 2, then we would still likely favor those
who were worse off to begin with. But if the worse off could gain only a
very modest improvement from Treatment 1, and those with Condition 2
were denied the opportunity for very great improvement, then Daniels
contends we probably would not award strict priority to the worst off.5 3 In
the context of our last chance therapies, for example, we could ask: Could
a just and caring managed care plan or Medicare program deny the TIAH
to individuals who had both end-stage heart disease (likely to kill them in
six months) and a terminal cancer (likely to kill them in two years) so that
the TIAH would be more available for individuals likely to gain at least five
years of additional life from it?
Daniels' third problem is the "aggregation problem." How do we
determine whether various aggregations of health benefits are just or not?
For example, if we can save one life or provide computerized functional
assistance to a quadriplegic that will significantly improve quality of life for
that person, which allocation would be more fair? If we make these one-to-
one comparisons, then we may be able to make judgments in which we are
morally confident. But if we have a fixed sum of money and we can either
save one life with that money or provide to ten quadriplegics that quality-
of-life/functionality-enhancing computer assistance, then which of these
allocations is more just, all things considered? There are some aggregation,
principles that are strongly morally justified, but there is no clear, well-
ordered account of how various aggregation principles might be related to
one another, or how they might be fairly applied in practice to deal with
numerous problems of health care rationing. In the context of last chance
therapies, we might pose this question: In the Medicare program is it more
important from the perspective of health care justice to fund
approximately 200,000 TIAHs (at an annual cost of about $35 billion) or to
fund a Medicare drug benefit with a ten-year projected cost of about $310
billion (roughly 60% of total drug costs for the elderly) ?54 All of the TIAHs
would be needed to sustain lives while only a relatively small fraction of the
prescription drugs would be necessary for that purpose.
Daniels' fourth unsolved rationing problem is the "democracy
problem." Daniels calls attention to the fact that in Oregon, vasectomies
were given a higher priority than hip replacements for health funding.
Prima facie, this ranking is indefensible. But if this ranking did reflect
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community values and the outcome of a fair democratic process, then we
ought to abide by it. On the other hand, if we are morally confident that
this ranking is mistaken, then we obviously have a substantive reference
point for the conclusion that calls into question the moral legitimacy of
appealing to fair democratic procedures to do fair health care rationing.
Obviously some concrete rationing problems ought to be entrusted to fair
democratic procedures while others need to be adjudicated "by appeal to
some prior notion of what constitutes a fair outcome of rationing. 5 5 But
what moral methodology do we have for determining which to choose in a
non-arbitrary way?
Here are some additional challenges to any approach to fair health
care rationing. I start with Callahan's "ragged edge" problem,56 which
challenges the fundamentals of the Oregon priority-setting process,
specifically, the reliance on medical condition/medical treatment pairs. If,
for example, you have a failing heart or a failing kidney, and a treatment is
available to address your health problem, then Oregon's Medicaid
program will pay for it if it has high enough priority. But there are
indefinitely distinguishable degrees of failing hearts and failing kidneys for
which essentially the same treatment will be available, but with results that
will range from minimally to extraordinarily beneficial. In its early years
dialysis yielded impressive results, at least for significant prolongation of
life. However, this was an artifact of the restrictions placed on acceptable
candidates when dialysis was scarce.
Today very old, very sick, very near to dying individuals are routinely
candidates for dialysis, though the costs will be large and the benefits
small. Why is this a routine judgment? Because there is no sharp edge,
morally speaking, that will permit us to judge confidently that a given
patient has a just claim to dialysis while another patient does not. In our
managed care plan, what would be a just enough and liberal enough
approach to addressing this problem? I earlier put dialysis outside the last
chance therapy category. My comments above suggest the need for
qualification. There are a significant number of cases where dialysis will
prolong life for a brief period (weeks or months), and in such cases I
contend we should think of it as a last chance therapy for purposes of
moral assessment.
Another example pertains to TIAHs, of which we now have a working
model. The cost of transplantation is around $160,000 each. 7 What is
known statistically is that each year there might be 350,000 individuals who
could benefit with five extra years of life expectancy from access to this
device. About 70% of those individuals would be over age sixty-five.58 How
many of these devices should a just and caring. society produce each year?
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If we did have some form of national health insurance, specifically,
something like the competing managed care plans envisioned by the
Clinton Administration, would justice require that the TIAH be a covered
benefit in every one of those plans? Would justice require that it be a
covered benefit for Medicare and/or Medicaid? Would it be just to allow
each employer to decide to cover it or not? Would it be fair enough if we
allowed individual ability to pay to determine the distribution of TIAHs?
This is one dimension of the ragged edge problem with respect to TIAHs.
The other dimension, as in the dialysis case, is whether we could deny a
TIAH to individuals whom we knew with near certainty would be dead in
slightly more than one year. The critical moral problem raised by these
ragged edge examples is this: How can we justifiably create sharp moral
edges for health care rationing when there are only ragged edges in
reality? We might be tempted to say that the morally safer course is to
provide access to such technologies whenever they offer any benefit at all.
But that denies (unjustly) the reality of the 'Just Caring" problem.
Resources are scarce. Money spent to fund very marginal TIAHs is money
not available to meet stronger just health needs.
Our next health care rationing problem is the "medical innovation/
dissemination" problem. As a society we want medical innovation, though
what we have gotten for our investments thus far are a lot of halfway and
ten-percent-of-the-way technologies. Recall the controversies that surfaced
in the recent past regarding autologous bone marrow transplants (ABMT)
for breast cancer or testicular cancer. This technology is very expensive-
somewhere in the vicinity of $100,000 to $150,000 per case. 59 Reported
results in the early 1990s initially suggested projected three-year survival
rates of 10%.0° There are more than 44,000 women each year in the United
States who will die of breast cancer. 6' A more recent study has shown the
positive results with ABMT are illusory, that ABMT does no better than
available conventional therapies.6 2 As is common in the United States, this
experimental technology had become semi-disseminated, resulting in
extremely arbitrary (morally speaking) inclusion and exclusion of women
relative to the technology. Given the original situation with ABMT, should
all women who have Stage IV breast cancer, and who have failed standard
chemotherapy, have an equal chance for access to ABMT, when the initial
positive results seem very marginal?
This same scenario is being replayed with Herceptin today (though the
cohort of women is much smaller). But the experimental medicine angle
adds another dimension to both the ABMT and Herceptin problems. The
additional question that needs to be posed is whether it would be just if
Herceptin were available at social cost only through approved clinical trials
11:2 (2002)
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and only to individuals who are deemed most "fit" for those clinical trials.
That is, these individuals would not have comorbidities that could
confound the results of the trials and thereby diminish the reliability of the
medical knowledge society would hope to gain. Our capacity to do clinical
trials efficiently, and to gain genuine medical knowledge to make both
more informed personal and policy choices, was substantially undermined
by the premature dissemination of ABMT. This may be happening with
Herceptin as well.
We turn next to the "Rule of Rescue" rationing problem. A good
society ought not allow individuals to die when it has the capacity to rescue
them and money alone prevents their rescue. More dramatically, we
should never "put a price on human life. 63 This problem is also referred to
as the "identified life" versus "statistical life" problem. Coby Howard in
Oregon is the perfect illustration of this (the Lakeberg conjoined twins
provide another illustration) .4 Coby was the eight-year-old boy with
leukemia who needed a $100,000 bone marrow transplant for any chance
at survival, but Oregon Medicaid refused to pay for it. A public example of
health care rationing like this usually elicits expressions of moral outrage,
often followed by funds that will give an individual access to that expensive
"life-saving" medical technology. Most often, the dismal predicted results
occur, with or without the funding.
Assertive middle-class women have often been successful in forcing
insurance companies to pay for ABMTs for their breast cancers. They are
successful because they are willing to make themselves visible as individuals
in desperate need of rescue. Saying to these women that it is just not
worth it from a societal point of view to save their lives seems insensitive
and cruel. But, as noted earlier, a defining feature of health care rationing
is that individuals must ultimately bear the burden of rationing. If all such
individuals could make themselves visible victims of rationing in need of
rescue, it would subvert all just schemes of health care rationing, including
last chance therapies. The Rule of Rescue is a morally feasible rule so long
as its required uses are small in number. Given rapid advances in
numerous, expensive forms of life-sustaining medical technology, the
application of the Rule of Rescue becomes ubiquitous. In the United
States, the vast majority of us are likely to require multiple such medical
rescues before we die.
Two moral problems are raised at the societal level by this Rule of
Rescue. One is the conflict between what justice requires of us in
maintaining fair rationing practices and what compassionate caring
requires of us when faced with individuals threatened with death for whom
there is "some chance" they might be saved, though at very great cost to
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society or to our managed care plan. The other moral problem involves a
conflict between a "slice-of-time" conception of justice and a "course-of-
life" conception of justice. Do we have any principled basis for
distinguishing rationing situations in which one rather than the other
conception of justice applies? To be clear, there may be some
circumstances in which a rationing decision is made most fairly by only
considering present circumstances; past use of expensive health resources
would be regarded as entirely irrelevant. But there are other circumstances
where past access to expensive life-prolonging medical care might justly
limit present access to marginally beneficial, very expensive, life-
prolonging medical care. Imagine a future situation, perhaps twenty years
from now, for HIV-positive individuals whose lives were first prolonged by
protease inhibitors, then integrase inhibitors (or other successor
medications) at $20,000 per year (aggregated to $400,000 for twenty
years). Could we justly deny such patients access to another life-prolonging
intervention costing $100,000 that would extend their lives for six more
months, part of the moral justification being that we had provided the
prior twenty years of life-sustaining care?
66
IV. JUST AND LIBERAL MANAGED CARE: KEY ELEMENTS
We cannot reasonably expect to bring about perfectly just or perfectly
liberal managed care plans. This has nothing to do with a recalcitrant
reality or sinful citizens. Rather, there are numerous reasonable values and
numerous considerations of health care justice that pertain to the practical
problems of choosing fair rationing policies and protocols, and there are
an indefinite number of trade-offs among these competing considerations
that will yield policies and practices that are 'just enough" and "liberal
enough." Any that are in fact chosen need to have both moral and political
legitimacy. There are two primary sources for that legitimacy. One is that
these decisions are made in bounded political space, space defined by what
I refer to as constitutional principles of health care justice. 7 These society-
wide principles protect society-wide justice. But they also create expansive
democratic space in which there can be a plurality of morally legitimate
policies and practices regarding health care rationing, which would be
reflected in different managed care plans. Such space, however, cannot be
devoid of justice-related structures. At this local level there must also be a
pattern of public reasons that shapes democratic deliberations about
health care rationing and protects to a large extent the moral legitimacy
and the fairness of the outcomes.
That brings us to the second source of moral and political legitimacy:
The actual trade-offs made are a product of rational democratic
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deliberation that all who might be affected by specific rationing policies or
protocols have had a fair opportunity to shape or endorse. At the very least
that means that all these rationing policies or protocols, and the reasoning
that would justify them, are public or visible. This is required by what Rawls
refers to as the "publicity condition," an element he sees as central to our
shared conception of justice.68 When decisions are just, nothing is or need
be hidden. This means that rationing decisions that are invisible, hidden
from public recognition or scrutiny, are presumptively unjust.69 Further, if
it can be honestly said that our rationing protocols are a product of public
democratic deliberations open to all, then it can be justifiably said that
these rationing protocols are freely and autonomously imposed by
individuals upon themselves. In the course of explicating rational
democratic deliberation it is important to respond to Daniels' objections,
especially the "democracy problem."
Several moral lessons can be learned from the Oregon experience of
health care rationing.7 ° I will recall two of them. First, justice requires that
there be limits to the claims that health care makes on total societal
resources and that these limits are expressed in the form of hard budgets.
The moral virtue of hard budgets is that they make clear and visible
necessary trade-offs among competing health needs and services. Second,
hard budgets give structure and coherence to a process of prioritizing
health needs and services. A process of prioritizing and actual priorities
that are explicit, rationally determined, and freely agreed upon protects
fairness against special pleading by individuals or health interest groups.
Do terminally ill individuals really have a just claim to last chance
therapies? If we ask this question in a perfectly abstract way, as a free-
standing moral problem devoid of any further context, then no morally or
rationally secure answer is available. But, if we ask this question in the
context of a fixed health care budget, and if we have talked and thought
through our health priorities with one another in a communal framework
over a substantial period of time, and if we want to achieve as much health
good as possible within the constraints established by certain basic
considerations of health care justice, then we will be able to distinguish
between just health claims by the terminally ill for life-prolonging
resources, and those other claims requiring an empathic response but
otherwise generating no just moral obligations. Again, the key to
preserving the overall fairness of this system is that we are all part of this
community over the course of a life. It is, of course, unlikely that many of
us would be part of any single managed care plan over the course of a life.
But we will likely be part of a society that has endorsed the broad
constitutional principles of health care justice that will shape/constrain all
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managed care plans that we might join over the course of our lives in that
society.
We know we will die and that our dying could be a prolonged and
expensive affair. A key moral concept for understanding what a just liberal
community is all about is the notion of reciprocity and fair terms of
cooperation. Do I believe I have a just claim to a half-million dollars worth
of health resources at age eighty for six extra months of a reasonable
quality of life? Again, there is no reasonable answer to this as an isolated
question. We must also ask whether we would be willing to spend the
additional taxes and insurance premiums required over the course of our
own lives to sustain the lives of an indefinite number of strangers in our
community in those same medical circumstances. If I say that they have
had ample opportunity to live a full life, that other more important health
needs or social priorities make a stronger claim on those dollars, or that I
wish to satisfy other personal preferences with those dollars, then clearly I
have no just claim to those communal resources at age eighty because I too
am a moral stranger to the rest of the community.
Talk of moral strangers will strike some as disheartening and
dehumanizing. It looks like a moral world surfeited with justice but devoid
of compassion. If this is the moral community implicit in Oregon's efforts,
then this is not a moral community worthy of national emulation. David
Eddy, however, offers us an insightful way of looking at Oregon's approach
to health reform, or managed care reform, that allows us to see both
justice and compassion. 7' He asks us to consider the case of a fifty-year-old
woman with metastatic breast cancer whose only hope for survival is an-
ABMT at a cost of $150,000. There is only a 5% chance of long-term
survival. Should a compassionate and caring community provide her with
that transplant? If that community has unlimited resources, then failing to
provide the transplant would be indecent. But no community has
unlimited resources. Something else always must be given up; and a just
and rational community will inquire carefully about what is given up.
Eddy asks us to imagine one thousand women, relatively young,
working at a factory. 72 They have an extra $1.5 million that can be spent
over the next ten years for health benefits. They are concerned about
breast cancer. Eddy asks whether they would want to spend this money on
ten ABMTs or on annual screening mammograms for those thousand
women. The basic math is easy. Do nothing: Thirty-six of those women will
die of breast cancer over ten years. Buy ten ABMTs: Thirty-five women will
die. Buy the screening mammograms: Twenty-nine women will still die. If a
reasonable, prudent, and just goal is maximizing lives saved or life years
saved in this situation, the choice is obvious. It seems that from every
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reasonable perspective the process is fair. No one has any unfair advantage.
All are behind what is a real world version of Rawls' "veil of ignorance." All
know that twenty-nine women will die of breast cancer no matter what. All
know they could be among those twenty-nine, and that they have denied
themselves a small chance of extra life years by agreeing to this trade-off.
All twenty-nine of those women will have names and faces in the future and
could command our compassion. But they would not have a moral right to
invoke the Rule of Rescue as a moral basis for access to an ABMT, arguing
that this is their last and only chance for therapy. If such a rule had
ultimate overriding moral authority, little money would be left over for any
less urgent health needs. If someone needed pain relief for his or her
cancer, and if there were any other opportunity to spend money for a small
chance to prolong life for someone else, then this latter option would
always win. Such a choice is flawed from the perspectives of prudence,
fairness, compassion, and cost-effectiveness. Given this, it seems
unimaginable that any rational democratic deliberative process would
endorse such a choice.
Imagine that one of these twenty-nine women, Abby, was able to gain
some media attention, hoping to use it to pressure the managed care plan
to make an exception for her. Such pressure is often sufficiently successful.
To recall Buchanan, the institutional reality in many managed care plans is
that no considered judgments of health care justice shape rationing,
prioritizing, and cost containment decisions within the plan.
Administrators make decisions that appear to plan members and the
public, if there is any awareness of them, as largely arbitrary, or driven by
self-interested economic considerations alone. A woman in that situation
really is alone against the plan. She likely deserves public support.
But then imagine this same woman in my deliberative version of
Eddy's managed care plan. She can no longer claim that she is "alone
against the plan." She made an agreement for a certain trade-off with 999
other women who "are the plan," and this was a fair agreement. If she
reneges, if she gets $150,000 in plan resources for her ABMT, if the plan
subsequently stopped covering screening mammograms for a year, then
the result will be that one more woman will end up with a deadly
metastatic breast cancer who should otherwise have survived. We will not
be able to identify her as that woman who should not have died. But her
death could only be described as unjust, while the other twenty-nine are
correctly described as unfortunate. In this managed care plan there has
been a complex set of rationing protocols, health care priorities, and
precedent-setting commitments rationally agreed to by plan members for
purposes of fairly sharing the risks and controlling the costs associated with
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meeting their health care needs. Abby might complain that she had not
agreed to this particular rationing protocol. If so, the moral and rational
burden would be on her to explain what the rational basis was for her
reservations. It is difficult to imagine what that might be, and what might
persuade other plan members that they made a mistake in this regard,
which they should now reconsider. Further, we can imagine Abby has been
part of this plan for years and has benefited from its rationing protocols.
That is, the burdens and risks associated with those protocols fell upon
other plan members, thereby freeing up resources for meeting Abby's
health needs. This too undercuts any moral basis for Abby's request for an
exception.
If we all belong to a managed care plan offering a comprehensive
package of health benefits, as proposed by the Clinton Administration in
1993, where "all belong" means that (1) there is no morally objectionable
sorting of individuals according to socioeconomic status, health status, or
race; (2) a single health budget is used to purchase all needed health
services; (3) the budget cannot possibly cover all likely needs for health
services; (4) the budget is limited through a priority-setting process and
mutually agreed upon rationing protocols that apply equally to all plan
members; and (5) we are all largely ignorant of our future health care
needs (which is mostly true), then the likelihood is that the rationing
protocols and health priorities that emerge from a rational process of
democratic deliberation will be 'just enough" or "fair enough."
We must concede there will be future Coby Howards (the eight-year-
old denied a bone marrow transplant for his cancer by the Oregon
Medicaid program), or our dear Abby, that is, individuals who will die
"prematurely" because they will have been denied the only medical
intervention that promised them some additional opportunity for
prolonged life for no better reason than that it was the informed and
impartial judgment of the community that the benefits promised by these
interventions were too small, too costly, and too uncertain. Still, the
essential fairness of the process is secure because any member of that
community, given the right combination of circumstances, could have a
child that was Coby Howard or could themselves be in circumstances
comparable to Abby.
We can imagine potentially biasing factors that might undercut the
impartiality of the deliberative process. For example, given emerging
genetic testing technology, some individuals are likely to know that they
are at elevated risk of Alzheimer's disease. But what will necessarily follow
from that? They will likely be tempted to give more priority for funding
research and treatment related to Alzheimer's disease. If they are
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reflective, however, they will realize that trade-offs have to be made within
the context of hard budgets, that Alzheimer's disease occurs late in life,
and that they are likely to have many other health needs they will want
adequately met before they have to worry about Alzheimer's disease.
All of us are to some degree rationally self-interested, but we are also
concerned about the health welfare and general well being of others--our
children, parents, spouses, siblings, friends, co-workers-all of which
considerably dilutes the biasing potential of our personal health concerns
and increases our reliance on more rational considerations in the process
of public deliberation that yields health priorities and rationing protocols.
This feature of our social life protects the overall impartiality and fairness
of the priority-setting process within a managed care plan. It does not
require of us any heroic moral commitments. A basic sense of justice,
commitment to respect fair terms of cooperation freely and mutually
agreed to, is all that is necessary, along with average abilities to process
rationally, medically relevant information.
A brief aside may be helpful for illustrative purposes. I have witnessed
many public conversations about health care rationing under the rubric of
the 'Just Caring" project.73 Personal responsibility for one's health elicits
strong reactions. I pose this issue: Should individuals faced with very high
end of life costs due in part to unhealthy personal choices, such as
smoking or high-fat diets, be denied costly medical interventions at social
expense because they have been irresponsible, and it is unfair that we
should have to pay for their irresponsible choices?
The first responders are typically those who strongly agree, most often
for the reasons suggested in the prior sentence. With a little supportive
prompting the next individuals to speak are those who have some
reservations. A sampling of responses would be the following: (1) How
"irresponsible" must someone have been with their health to merit denial
of expensive life-prolonging care? If they smoked for twenty years but have
given up smoking for the past ten, would we still be justified in denying
them life-sustaining care? What if during that ten-year period they relapsed
four times for several months each time? How many fast food meals would
one have to consume per year to be subject to this denial? And who would
be keeping track? And who would judge which sorts of anti-health
behaviors, such as speeding on a rain-slick highway, would result in this
penalty? (2) How would a rationing protocol such as this change the
professional role of physicians? Would we have to label some physicians as
"prosecutorial physicians" and others as "defense physicians" so that
patients would know with whom they could be candid about their health
history? Would we have "Fifth Amendment rights" with respect to our
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health history? (3) How would we factor in our genetic endowment in
making judgments about responsibility for our health circumstances?
Some people have genes that result in very high levels of the "bad
cholesterol" (and early heart attacks), even if they eat what would appear
to be a reasonably healthy diet. (4) And what about individuals who have
been victims of abuse, who have taken up less than healthy behaviors (e.g.,
smoking or over-eating) in connection with that abused behavior?
This is a compact list of some considerations that emerge in this
dialogic process. Further, these considerations are often quite effective in
getting those who strongly agree with the suggested rationing protocol to
change their minds, or at least to express much less confidence in the
rightness of their moral judgment. This happens quickly, in part because
individuals have not thought carefully about their views, in part because
most people are more reasonable and less rigid than we expect. On a small
scale, this suggests that rational democratic deliberation can be successful
in the real world; it is notjust a philosopher's utopian thought experiment.
We return now to Daniels' "democracy problem." If we see rational
democratic deliberation as a matter of pure procedural justice, then there
is no correcting of results that seem counterintuitive. On the other hand, if
it can be corrected by an appeal to some prior notion of what counts as a
fair rationing outcome, then we wonder what the point of the democratic
process is. Then there is Daniels' "fair chances/best outcome" problem,
which is related to the democracy problem. Recall Alice and Betty who
both need a transplant, are the same age, and have spent the same period
of time waiting for a transplant. Both will be dead in a week without the
transplant. Alice will live only two years, while Betty will live twenty. Who
should get the transplant? We get the best outcome, maximum number of
quality-adjusted life years saved, by saving Betty. But Alice wants a lottery,
arguing that each has an equal right to life. Both have reasonable and
morally compelling considerations on their side. Oregon's democratic
deliberations favored the net benefit approach. Does Alice have a moral
right to be aggrieved at this result? Has she been harmed in a morally
significant sense? Does this undermine the moral authority of the
democratic deliberative process for yielding just results?
I believe my model of rational democratic deliberation can respond to
Daniels' challenges. We assume that no matter how fine-grained a
conception of health care justice we develop, it will never be fine-grained
enough to generate a uniquely correct complete set of just rationing
protocols. There are innumerable reasonable, morally permissible trade-
offs that might be made in the course of articulating some set of rationing
protocols. This moral space is "the domain of just democratic decision-
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making." Again, within this space we cannot identify the "most just" set of
rationing protocols possible for our society or our managed care plan.
Many possible trade-off patterns will be 'Just enough," all things
considered, especially when we recall that other values besides justice are a
legitimate part of the overall moral equation.
Note that two critical conditions elicit the need for a democratic
deliberative process and morally justify that appeal. The first is that we
cannot simply allow individual liberty to operate with respect to the
resolution of this particular rationing decision. For if we did allow medical,
administrative, or consumer discretion to be ultimately and pervasively
determinative, then there would be the potential for unjust, arbitrary, and
discriminatory results, though I emphasize again that there is a domain
beyond justice where such individual discretion, along with social
beneficence, is morally permissible.
Imagine, for example, that our managed care plan must decide
whether to use high osmolality contrast agents (HOCAs), as opposed to
low osmolality contrast agents (LOCAs) for CT scans. HOCAs cost $10 per
dose while LOCAs cost $180 per dose. 4 There is one chance in a thousand
that the less expensive drug will cause anaphylactic shock, which can be
reversed by health professionals who know they must be prepared for such
events. The cost difference seems relatively small for any individual case.
However, given the millions of CT scans done each year in the United
States, we would add at least $2 billion to total costs if we used only LOCAs,
with proportional results in any managed care plan.
It is easy to imagine a health plan choosing the less expensive drug
through the sort of democratic deliberative process we envision. If it meant
saving $2 billion per year that could be used to meet what plan members
judged to be higher priority health needs for themselves, then that is both
rational and just. But nothing is obviously wrong with choosing the more
expensive drug. However, if the choice of drug were left to medical or
administrative discretion, then it is easy to imagine more knowledgeable
and assertive patients demanding the more expensive drug, or physicians
permitting daily subtle biases associated with friendship and social class to
affect their decisions. This would clearly be unfair. In this case we could
allow wealthier consumers to purchase the more expensive drug with their
own private resources (unsubsidized by tax deductions); and this would
not be unfair because the benefits are very marginal, the majority of other
plan members have traded off their access to that drug for other health
benefits they judge more important, and other plan members are not
harmed by private purchases.
Our second condition for appealing to the rational democratic
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deliberative process is that there are plural choice possibilities, all of which
have prima facie moral and political legitimacy, but none of which are
unequivocally superior from a moral, political, or rational perspective.
"Prima facie moral and political legitimacy" means that the constraints
represented by our constitutional principles of health care justice are not
violated. This is the situation regarding Alice and Betty. A good case can be
made for going with a decision rule that might favor a lottery in this
situation, or going with net benefits. Any number of complex decision
rules might be adopted, especially if we vary morally relevant case facts,
such as age of the individuals, likelihood of survival for each, morally
permissible quality of life considerations, and so on. What is morally
important is that whatever decision rule we adopt through the democratic
deliberative process must be applied consistently over time to all members
of the society/health plan. So long as that decision rule is in place and was,
in fact, approved by both Alice and Betty, or their democratic
representatives, when they did not know their future medical
circumstances, neither one will have just cause for moral complaint, no
matter what the outcome.
Again, individual participants in this democratic process are ongoing
members of this community so that the trade-offs they agree to, some
specific distribution of benefits and risks, is a distribution that they are
imposing on themselves. That is, in many cases of rationing, say, with
reference to the health care needs of the elderly (our future elderly
selves), the distribution of benefits and risks does not occur simultaneously
for any individual. It would clearly be unfair for a younger individual to
derive the benefits of rationing health care for the elderly and then have
the option of exiting that health plan as an older person in order to escape
the risks and burdens of rationing for an older individual.
To address Daniels' democracy problem, in the case of Alice and Betty
a number of rational 'just enough" decision rules might have been chosen.
The deliberative process yields a decision among those options, provides a
reasoned account for that decision, and legitimates that decision. In that
respect, the process is not otiose. A philosopher or managed care
administrator could have made "the same decision," but it would not have
the same moral legitimacy because the democratic deliberative process is
an essential part of the legitimacy of the decision itself. This is what makes
the decision an autonomous choice for all individuals in the group, even if
some disagree with that specific choice. A deliberative decision can "go
wrong" in all the usual ways, just as scientific research can "go wrong" in all
the usual ways. Any particular deliberative decision might violate one of
our constitutional principles of health care justice, just as we argue in our
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legal system about whether "hate speech" ought to be protected under our
constitutional commitment to freedom of speech. Or a particular
deliberative decision might fail to take into account relevant scientific facts
about Herceptin or the artificial heart or other medical technologies that
might be the focus of a rationing decision. Or a particular deliberative
decision may fail to give due weight to the pattern of reasons and prior
considered judgments of health care rationing within the managed care
plan, thereby creating a kind of moral incoherence that would threaten
the legitimacy of the decision. In all such cases, the necessary corrective, as
in the scientific enterprise, would be more democratic deliberation since
no other ultimate authority exists for an appeal.
Two other points must be made briefly with respect to understanding
the moral and political legitimacy of rational democratic deliberation. The
first is that our constitutional principles of health care justice have
emerged and will continue to emerge through the same process of moral
discourse that has generated contemporary medical ethics. This means
that these principles are modified, refined, and specified through their use
in the deliberative process in addressing a broad range of concrete
rationing problems. This is analogous to the decision-making process of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The adequacy of any particular set of
constitutional principles of health care justice will be determined from the
perspective of wide reflective equilibrium, which is to say there are
coherence considerations among the principles that would have to be
worked out, as well as coherence considerations between the principles
and proposed sets of rationing protocols within a given managed care
plan. In addition, we would have to account for the actual empirical
consequences of putting a particular set of rationing protocols in place,
plus other empirical considerations related to emerging medical
technologies and other aspects of medical practice.
Coherence considerations should not be overstressed. "Rough
coherence" among our rationing protocols in a particular managed care
plan will be 'just enough." There is no moral necessity of having perfect
consistency among various rationing trade-offs that have been rationally
democratically approved. Again, to address Daniels' concerns, the
constitutional principles of health care justice provide normative reference
points for critically assessing the process and outcomes of our democratic
decision-making process; but clearly they are incapable of yielding the
outcomes that are needed from the process itself, which is to say that they
do not render the process itself otiose.
My second point is this: While these principles and the democratic
deliberative process together comprise the domain of health care justice,
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there is also this domain beyond justice, a domain of individual freedom
and social beneficence. This domain provides moral space in which
individuals can use their own private resources to purchase health services
not required by just health care policies, and various social groups can
choose to be differentially beneficent in ways that reflect their specific
comprehensive visions, which may be shared by only a small subset of the
membership of a given managed care plan. That is, a church or social
group may choose to raise the funds for, say, Herceptin therapy for one of
their members who otherwise would be denied it because it is not included
in the health services package guaranteed to all. In a liberal society this is
not obviously unjust.
V. LAST CHANCE THERAPIES AND RATIONAL DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION
Before concluding, I return to Daniels' other challenges to argue that
my model of rational democratic deliberation is capable of meeting those
challenges.
First, recall the moral distinction between "slice-of-time" and "course-
of-life" issues of just health care rationing. "Slice-of-time" issues mean that
the degree to which an individual has used the health care system in the
past will be morally irrelevant to judging whether that individual has a just
claim now, say, to an expensive form of life-prolonging medical care. The
"course-of-life" perspective means that prior use of the health care system
may justly constrain meeting current health needs. My claim is that our
deliberative process, properly structured, can determine the moral
appropriateness of either perspective in particular circumstances. That is,
there are no strong moral principles that absolutely require we choose one
or the other in specific circumstances. There is ample deliberative space.
However, we should also note that the deliberative process as a whole
requires a comprehensive "course-of-life" perspective if we hope to have an
overall just, stable, effective approach to health care rationing. Isolated,
episodic rationing decisions are almost certain to be unjust.
Some of Daniels' challenges under the "priorities" problem or the
"aggregation" problem lose much of their moral force when we recognize
this. For example, should we fund TLAHs in the Medicare program or a
prescription drug benefit? Should we reduce our level of commitment to
artificial hearts for middle-aged individuals if we can purchase instead
computerized functional assistance for ten disabled persons with the same
funds? The apparent moral difficulty of the examples derives from the
unstated assumption that individuals are already ensconced in one or
another of these groups by virtue of their being afflicted with a specific
medical problem. That is, we are looking at these examples from the
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current point in time. But if we go back to that prior point in time when we
need to join a health plan, and if we have little knowledge of what our
future health needs might be, and if we have to make a decision about a
fair and prudent allocation of health resources with a limited budget, then
our problem looks like simply a macro version of the Alice and Betty
problem, or the Abby problem. That is, there might be a number of
morally permissible, 'Just enough," trade-offs we might make through a
process of rational democratic deliberation, none of which are uniquely
morally required.
We need to say more about the slice of time/course of life problem of
health care rationing. When we are faced with the need to make a costly
rationing decision, why do we sometimes consider morally relevant prior
use of the health care system and at other times judge it morally irrelevant?
A critic might say:
What generates a presumptively just claim to limited health resources is
having a health need. A need is a need; it is morally irrelevant how often
that need has occurred for a particular individual (as in the case of a
serious chronic illness). If it is a genuine health need, then it must be
treated consistently as such.
But my contention is that many other morally relevant considerations
can come into play at different points in an individual's life and modify
that health need in a way that would justify our giving that "same" need
lower priority at one point in time as opposed to another. There are at
least six potentially morally relevant variables that could have a bearing on
whether we respond to a particular need from a course-of-life perspective
or a slice-of-time perspective. These six variables are: (1) quality of life
(currently and after treatment), using Daniels' fair equality of opportunity
account to give moral concreteness to this notion; (2) age; (3) probability
of survival if the patient has access to expensive life-prolonging
intervention; (4) number of additional life-years gained as a result of
treatment; (5) cost per extra life-year gained; and (6) prior just democratic
rationing agreements.
Space does not permit a long explanation of each variable. But I can
offer some helpful illustrative analysis in connection with our "last chance
therapy" problem. I argue that age is a morally relevant consideration in
making some sorts of rationing decisions.75 Fair and prudent individuals,
ignorant of their future life expectancy, would likely allocate more
resources to relatively younger years than is currently the case in our
society in order to maximize the probability of their achieving a normal life
expectancy. This view implies we could pick an age beyond which
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individuals would not have access to the artificial heart at social expense. If
we picked age seventy for that purpose, we would be committing ourselves
to producing and paying for about 100,000 of these artificial hearts per
year, which is roughly the predicted need prior to that age. Why age
seventy and why 100,000? These numbers are somewhat arbitrary.
Democratic deliberation could alter these numbers up or down justifiably,
depending upon a number of variables. Here are some judgments of which
I am morally confident that a democratic deliberative process could justly
endorse.
First, it would be unjust if there were no public funding for artificial
hearts under any circumstances. This is because there would be thousands
of relatively young individuals who would be faced with premature death
from cardiac failure and no other medical alternative to significantly
prolong their lives. It would be unjust to determine access to TIAJ entirely
by individual ability to pay or ability to elicit a charitable response from
some local community.
Second, it would not necessarily be unjust to exclude access to the
TIAH from the Medicare benefit package, thereby leaving access to
individual ability to pay. To simplify what are in fact very complex possible
policy trade-offs, if secure access to prescription drugs for the elderly at $30
billion per year or more is what we have to give up as a Medicare benefit in
order to cover some number of artificial hearts, then I would argue strong
egalitarian, utilitarian, and prudential considerations would all justify
choosing the prescription drug benefit instead of the TJAH.
Third, it is expected that on average the TIAH would increase the life
expectancy of an individual by five years. I would argue that we could justly
make differential distributions of the TIAH in connection with predicted
life expectancy in specific medical circumstances through the deliberative
process. Thus, if an individual were sixty-eight, and if we did permit access
to the TIAH at Medicare expense for those under age seventy, we could
have a democratically legitimated rule that such an individual would have
to have a minimal predicted life expectancy of more than two years in
order to have an actual just claim to the TIAH. Such a rule would not
violate any constitutional principle of health care justice. That individual
could still purchase a TIM-I from his or her own resources, which means
that a poorer individual in the same circumstances would not have been
treated unjustly if he or she then dies at age sixty-eight because he or she
cannot afford the TIAH. But there is another part to this rule. We could
justly pay for access to the TIAH for younger individuals, say, age sixty or
below, even if they were unlikely to survive two years, as long as it was likely
they would survive a year, part of the moral justification being that they
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had not had the opportunity to live as long a life as others.
Fourth, we can imagine a fifty-two-year-old individual who is HIV-
positive, whose life has been sustained for the past twenty years by protease
inhibitors (or their successors) at a total cost of $400,000, who now has a
failing heart, and who might survive no more than two to three years with
the TIAH. Such an individual has a presumptively just claim to a TIAH,
and our constitutional principle of health care justice regarding the
protection of fair equality of opportunity would warrant that presumption.
His past use of the health care system would be morally irrelevant to
making a fair rationing judgment now. But if we alter this scenario just a
bit, then we will get a different result. Imagine that he has moderate to
advanced AIDS dementia. Then I would argue we could justifiably deny
him the TIAH, appealing to the "current and future quality of life
criterion" mentioned above. This is a very complicated area for moral
analysis, complicated by potential threats to the rights of disabled
individuals. But this issue can be justly addressed.
My goal would be to provide individuals with disabilities whatever
resources were available in our society for protecting effectively their access
to fair and effective equality of opportunity. We have an array of
technologies today--often expensive-for providing to individuals
functional equivalents for various disabilities. All other things being equal,
we would have a strong moral obligation to provide access to such
technologies. However, the most crucial morally relevant consideration is
that such access will result in effective functional restoration to a
significant degree. If such an individual developed heart failure at age fifty-
two, as with our HIV-positive patient, then he would have an equally strong
claim to a TLAH at societal expense, and prior societal expenditures on his
behalf would be morally irrelevant. Similarly, if he were afflicted with some
untreatable serious dementia, as with our HIV-positive patient who
developed AIDS dementia, then he could be justly denied access to a
TIAH, and this would not represent any form of unjust discrimination
against disabled individuals, especially if it were the case that there were
rational democratic legitimation of a general rationing guideline that
would deny our own possible future demented selves access to expensive
life-prolonging medical care under those circumstances. As nearly as I can
tell, such a democratically endorsed judgment would not violate any
constitutional principle of health care justice. It would not be
discriminatory in a morally objectionable sense, nor would it violate the
equal moral respect to all persons.
This analysis provides us with a helpful perspective for addressing
some specific instances of last chance therapies. Again, these are just
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schematic comments. Consider Herceptin. Many of the women faced with
metastatic breast cancer will be relatively young or middle-aged. This
would typically trigger the judgment that justice requires doing everything
medically possible to prolong their lives for as long as they find their lives
worth living so that they have an opportunity to achieve a normal life
expectancy. However, the background assumption is that the life gained is
significant and costworthy. This would be a questionable assumption if the
average gain in life expectancy is only five months more than alternative
available therapies, and if the cost of achieving that result is more than
$70,000, which works out to a cost per QALY of about $160,000. Here
Eddy's strategy in thinking about breast cancer options is quite apropos.
We must ask ourselves whether there are other investments for health
dollars where we can save more high-quality life years at a lower cost. But
perhaps a morally and politically better way to ask the question would be to
consider whether there are alternate investments in cancer prevention or
cancer therapy-especially cancers for which women might be at greater
risk-that would reasonably and justifiably command the dollars otherwise
to be spent on Herceptin. Again, if we imagine Eddy's thousand women
working for a company with a better-than-average (but limited) health
benefit package at an earlier point in time deciding collectively and
autonomously what to include in that benefit package, it is hard to imagine
that they would include Herceptin, given all their other possible health
care needs. Thus, women denied access to Herceptin at social expense
would not be treated unjustly.
This social judgment has other beneficial effects worth noting. It
provides helpful information to women and their families in such
circumstances. It says that a thoughtful social judgment has been made
that this therapy is marginally beneficial at best and not costworthy, that a
family that was tempted to sacrifice access to a college education for their
children in order to purchase Herceptin would be making an unwise
choice. Similarly, churches and other social organizations hold fundraisers
to help underwrite the costs of very expensive medical interventions that
offer the only hope for individuals otherwise faced with imminent death.
This is the domain of beneficence, charity freely given. We generally
applaud such efforts, though if the analysis above is correct, the
implication is that there will be times when such applause ought to be
withheld.
Though we see charitable responses as something "freely offered," not
a matter of moral obligation in most specific instances, this does not mean
that thoughtless or unreflective charitable giving should be commended.
Again, we need to keep in mind that charitable dollars are limited; few
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churches or other social organizations could afford to raise the funds for
all expensive, life-prolonging medical care their members might need that
are not covered by public or private insurance. Thus, if there is a public,
democratically ratified rationing protocol that would deny women with
metastasized breast cancer access to Herceptin for the reasons given above,
then the implicit message to socially beneficent organizations is that they
should not imprudently expend their resources to assist such individuals in
unfortunate circumstances to gain access to Herceptin.
This same analysis helps us address the challenges posed by the Rule of
Rescue and identified individuals needing access to last chance therapies.
Nothing will diminish the psychological difficulty of dealing with these
circumstances. The Rule of Rescue in its traditional application is morally
compelling, in part, because it rarely needs to be employed, at least outside
health care. But given our enormously expanding technological capacity
for maintaining life, and focusing on the urgency of the present medical
circumstances of an individual, the Rule of Rescue has pervasive
applicability. It is wholly without the moral context that originally made it a
reasonable moral rule. Applied to health care in this promiscuous fashion,
it will completely undermine any fair or reasonable effort at health care
rationing and health care cost containment.
Finally, the identified individuals in these urgent, tragic, and
unfortunate circumstances are certainly entitled to a caring and
compassionate response from our society. There are many ways in which
this compassionate response might be conveyed. But the moral
requirement of compassion must not be confused with the moral
obligations of justice. Providing such unfortunate individuals (women
wanting access to Herceptin) with health resources to which they have no
just claim, thereby diminishing the pool of resources to which others have
ajust claim, represents a failure of both compassion and justice.
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